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"Enemy-Controlled Battlespace":
The Contemporary Meaning and
Purpose of Additional Protocol I's
Article 44(3) Exception
Kubo Maddk* and Michael N. Schmitt**
ABSTRACT

The contemporarypropensity for, and risk of, armed conflict taking
place among the civilian population has cast a new light on several
long-standing challenges to the application of international
humanitarianlaw (IHL). One is the determination of combatant status
and, more specifically, the question of when the requirement for the
combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population may
exceptionally be relaxed. In addressing this question, the Article reexamines Additional Protocol I's Article 44(3) and adopts an
interpretationthereof that better comports with its object and purpose
than thosepreviously prevalent. After exposing the limitationsof relying
solely on drafting history to understand the provision's exception, the
object and purpose of Article 44(3) are assessed. On that basis, the
authors proffer "enemy control of battlespace" as the appropriate
standard for determining situations to which the exception applies.
Finally, they highlight a number of legal safeguards that promote the
protection of the civilian population whenever the exception is
applicable.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The notion of combatancy lies at the heart of international
humanitarian law (IHL). Parties to an armed conflict are obligated by
customary and treaty law to distinguish between combatants and
civilians and direct their operations only against the former, except
when civilians have lost their protection from attack through
membership in an organized armed group or by directly participating
in hostilities.' Combatancy also accords rights and entitlements.
During an international armed conflict, combatants enjoy immunity
from prosecution in both domestic and international tribunals for
2
activities related to the hostilities that are lawful under IHL, most
notably intentionally killing the enemy and, in some situations,
launching an attack that is certain to incidentally harm civilians.
Additionally, combatants are entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status,
and the many protections that attach thereto, upon capture. 3
While these basic obligations and rights are universally accepted,
the precise criteria for qualification as a combatant lack clarity. This
Article zeroes in on the meaning of a single criterion resident in Article

* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter. Previous versions of this article were
presented at the "War in Cities and the Law of Armed Conflict" Conference at Brigham
Young University Law School in February 2018 and at the "Responding to Hybrid
Threats by Force: International and National Law Aspects" Conference at Palacky
University in the Czech Republic in May 2018. In addition to the helpful feedback
received from participants in those conferences, we would like to acknowledge with
gratitude the insightful comments on drafts by Dr. Ana Beduschi, Dr. Russell Buchan,
Prof. Geoffrey Corn, Gp. Capt. Ian Henderson, Dr. Aurel Sari, and Dr. Noam Zamir. Any
errors or omissions are our sole responsibility.
** Professor of International Law, University of Exeter; Howard S. Levie Professor,
United States Naval War College; Francis Lieber Distinguished Scholar, United States
Military Academy at West Point. The views expressed are those of the author in his
personal capacity alone.
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1.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48, 51 (2)
(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol l]; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see
also 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW rr. 1, 6 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CIHL STUDY]; INT'L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN

HOSTRITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 27-36, 46 (2009); MICHAEL N.
SCHMITT, CHARLES H. B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT r. 1.1.2 (Int'l Inst. of Humanitarian Law 2006).
Additional Protocol I, supranote 1, art. 43(2).
2.
Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
3.
4A, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]
(defining prisoners of war); Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(1).
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44(3) of Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The text of the provision is as follows:
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation
preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant
cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided
that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:
(a) During each military engagement, and
(b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to
participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be
considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c). 4

The second sentence of Article 44(3) is noteworthy because it offers
combatants exceptional relief from the general obligation to
distinguish themselves. Whether the exception is militarily sensible is
the subject of heated and long-standing disagreement, with certain
nonparty states, most notably the United States and Israel, citing the
provision as, in part, their basis for refusal to ratify the treaty.5
Although we address the underlying logic of the competing positions in
passing, it is not our purpose here to relitigate this controversy.
Rather, our objective is more focused-to elucidate the meaning of the
determinative phrase "cannot so distinguish" in the context of
contemporary conflict.
Our exploration of the functioning of Article 44(3) is apposite for a
number of reasons. Firstly, the number of states parties to AP I is

4.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3).
5.
See Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
Geneva, Switz., 1974-1977, vol. VI, Summary Records of the Fourth Session Plenary
Meetings, at 121 T 17 (Fed. Pol. Dep't Bern, 1978) [hereinafter Official Records]
(explaining Israel's vote against the draft rule on grounds that it "was contrary to the
spirit and to a fundamental principle of humanitarian law"); Message from President

Ronald Reagan Transmitting Additional Protocol II to the Senate, 100th Cong., Treaty
Doc. 100-2 (Jan. 29, 1987) ("Another provision [of Additional Protocol I] would grant
combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not satisfy the traditional
requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise
comply with the laws of war. This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and
other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves."); see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF
WAR MANUAL 119, ¶ 4.6.1.2 (2016) [hereinafter DoD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] (noting the
United States' objections "to the way [Additional Protocol l] relaxed the requirements for
obtaining the privileges of combatant status").
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slowly but steadily increasing. 6 As such, the application of its
provisions is statistically likely to be more frequent in the future. This
is of particular importance with respect to those provisions that, like
the rule in question, arguably do not already amount to customary
international law that is binding on all states.7
Secondly, the relevance of Article 44(3)'s exception to the
requirement of distinction is on the rise due to the evolving nature of
warfare. Since the 1970s, decolonization and proxy wars, which were
the staple of Cold War-era armed conflict, have been replaced in great
part, albeit not entirely, by asymmetrical conflicts pitting military
superpowers like the United States and its partners against
significantly weaker forces and localized armed groups with limited
resources and military strength, as was the case in both Afghanistan
and Iraq.8 During such insurgencies or other modes of asymmetrical
warfare, the forces of the weaker party are often based in, and conduct
hostilities among, the civilian population. The exception ameliorates
the difficulty of effectively fighting an asymmetrically advantaged
opponent in such circumstances by countenancing the suspension of
the obligation to distinguish oneself when the conditions of the
provision are met.
Urbanization will exacerbate the phenomenon of war among the
civilian population. While in 1974 only 1.5 billion people lived in cities,
the corresponding figure for 2018 is estimated at 4.2 billion-nearly a
threefold increase.9 To place the trend in context, by the middle of this
0
century, almost 70 percent of the global population will live in cities.'
In that war usually follows people, the flight to cities has brought with
it a growing incidence of urban warfare." Crucially, asymmetrically
weaker opponents will often find it strategically and operationally
advantageous to exploit the urban environment in order to maintain a
realistic prospect of victory over their militarily more powerful

See States Partyto the FollowingInternationalHumanitarianLaw and Other
6.
Related Treaties, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (June 4, 2018), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/ihl [https://perma.cc/93UJ-Y5HB] (archived Sept. 10, 2018).
For the customary status of Article 44 of Additional Protocol I, see infra text
7.
accompanying notes 21-24.
See generally MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS (2d ed. 2007) (analyzing the
8.
patterns of war and violence and comparing recent wars with those in the past).
9.

UN DEP'T OF EcoN. & Soc. AFFAIRS, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE

2018 REVISION-KEY FACTS 2, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/
NJXF] (archived Sept. 10, 2018).
10.

[https://perma.cclC7JT-

UN DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE

2014 REVISION-HIGHLIGHTS 7, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/publications/files/wup20l4
-highlights.pdf [https://perma.ccl93C8-XT2N] (archived Sept. 10, 2018).
11.
Cf. David Campbell et al., Introduction to Urbicide: The Killing of Cities?,
10(2) THEORY & EVENT 1, 1 ("As traditional wars between nation states conducted in
open terrain have become objects of relative curiosity, so the informal, 'asymmetric' or
'new' wars that centre on localized struggles over strategic urban sites have become the
norm.").
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enemies. 12 In light of these and other realities of modern combat,
situations falling within the purview of the "cannot so distinguish"
exception will become ever more common.
Thirdly, in light of remarkable advances in intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and the means to
communicate the information attained thereby, concealment and
deception have become pervasive features of modern-day combat
operations.1 3 Appearing to be a civilian, or otherwise frustrating the
enemy's ability to distinguish civilians from combatants, offers
meaningful tactical advantages, both in terms of avoiding
identification by the enemy and mounting one's own offensive
operations. Indeed, the tactical advantages of muddying enemy
targeting by operating from within the civilian population have been
tragically illustrated during recent conflicts in which insurgents have
prevented the civilian population from fleeing cities where combat is
expected. 14 It is thus necessary to understand where the legal limits of
such tactics lie beyond the basic prohibition of perfidy, which bans the
feigning of civilian or other protected status in order to kill, wound, or
capture the enemy.15 The scope of Article 44(3) is central to such limits.
To lay the foundation for assessing application of the phrase
"cannot so distinguish" in modern warfare, Part II of the Article
introduces IHL's extant standards for combatancy. The piece then
turns to the travaux prdparatoiresof Article 44(3) in Part III. This
analysis exposes the limitations of relying solely on the provision's
drafting history to understand the notion. Therefore, and consistent
with the interpretive approach set forth in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,1 6 we look to the object and purpose of Article 44(3)
to inform our examination in Part IV. Armed with an understanding of
this telos of the provision, in Part V of the Article we proffer "enemy
control of battlespace" as the appropriate standard for determining
when the requirement to distinguish oneself may exceptionally be
attenuated. Finally, Part VI highlights a number of legal safeguards
that mitigate the risk associated with use of enemy control of the

12.
See IVAN ARREGUiN-TOFr, HOW THE WEAK WIN WARS: A THEORY OF
ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 12-13 (2005).
13.
See SCOTT GERWEHR & RUSSELL W. GLENN, THE ART OF DARKNESS:
DECEPTION AND URBAN OPERATIONS 37-38 (2000).
14.
See, e.g., ICRC & INTERACTION, OUTCOME REPORT: WHEN WAR MOVES TO
CITIES: PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN URBAN AREAS 2 (2017) [hereinafter WHEN WAR
MOVES TO CITIES], https:/reliefweb.int/report/world/when-war-moves-cities-protectioncivilians-urban-areas-outcome-report-may-2017 (illustrating some examples of urban

warfare and its impact on civilians).
15.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 37(1) (setting out the prohibition
of perfidy and listing examples of prohibited conduct).
16.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.

1358

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 51:1353

battlespace vis-A-vis Article 44(3)'s reference to situations in which
combatants "cannot so distinguish" themselves.
Two cautionary notes are in order, lest the analysis that follows
be understood in an overbroad manner. First, the discussion applies
only to international armed conflict. This is because the concept of
combatancy is limited to armed conflicts that are international in
character; there is no equivalent to combatant status in noninternational armed conflicts.1 7 Second, the analysis is confined to
conflicts between states parties to AP I (and, possibly, those involving
parties to the conflict that accept and apply the Protocol on an ad hoc
basis' 8 ). Although a number of the Protocol's provisions either reflect

or have acquired the force of customary law,1 9 that is not the case with
all of the instrument's rules.2 0
In this regard, the customary status of Article 44 is nuanced. Most
of its components are considered reflective of customary international
law. This includes the first sentence of paragraph 3, which prescribes
that combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian
2
population in order to enjoy the benefits of combatancy. 1 In particular,
that sentence has been recognized by the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) as an expression of customary international

See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
17.
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 41 (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES]; Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79, 85 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013); GARY D.
SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 201
(2d ed. 2016).
Cf. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 96(2).
18.
For an early observation to this effect, see Yoram Dinstein, The Application
19.
of Customary International Law Concerning Armed Conflicts in the National Legal
Order, in NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29, 34

(Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1990) ("[I]n my assessment, the great majority of the norms
of the Protocol-perhaps as many as 85/--qualify as declaratory or noncontroversial[.]").
See, e.g., John Bellinger & William James Haynes, A US Government
20.
Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 443, 446 (2007) ("Additional
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions contain far-reaching provisions, but States
did not at the time of their adoption believe that all of those instruments' provisions
reflected rules that already had crystallized into customary international law; indeed,
many provisions were considered ground-breaking and gap-filling at the time.").
See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants,
21.
Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, PROGRAM ON
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH: HARVARD UNIVERSITY: OCCASIONAL

PAPER SERIES, Winter 2005, at 64-65 ('The first sentence of Article 44(3) of Additional
Protocol I is essentially a statement of customary international law[.]"). But see Anthony
Rogers, Combatant Status, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 116 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds.,

2007) ("Under customary law . . . if a person qualifies as a prisoner of war, he must be
accorded prisoner-of-war status even if he has not distinguished himself from the civilian
population.").
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law. 22 However, this is not the case with the second sentence of the
same paragraph, which relaxes the requirement.2 3 On the contrary, a
number of nonparty states have publicly objected to the exception. 24
Nonetheless, it remains valid law for states parties to the Protocol and
will be examined here as such.

II. COMBATANT STATUS: THE LEx SCRIPTA

The legal status of fighters engaged in hostilities is determined by
the regulation of combatant status under IHL. As with many other IHL
issues, the relevant rules constitute an attempt to craft a balance
between military and humanitarian considerations. 25 On the one hand,
the legal designation of combatants serves to allow armed forces
involved in an international armed conflict to take those actions that
are necessary to bring about their opponent's defeat (principle of
military necessity). This is accomplished by affording members of the
armed forces combatant immunity for certain acts that would be
unlawful but for the fact that they were undertaken during an armed
conflict. On the other hand, by carving out a category of persons who
alone are liable to be targeted lawfully, IHL also serves the
countervailing goal of protecting the lives and health of those who do
not directly participate in hostilities (principle of humanity).2 6
Affording combatants the benefits of POW status once they are hors de
combat due to surrender or capture, and thus no longer able to fight,
also reflects the humanitarian underpinning of IHL. 2 7
The interaction of these two foundational principles finds its most
fundamental expression in the rule of distinction, today enshrined in

22.
ICRC CIHL STUDY, supra note 1, at 384.
23.
Cf. id. at 387-89.
24.
See, e.g., DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, at 119 T 4.6.1.2 ("The
United States has objected to the way these changes relaxed the requirements for
obtaining the privileges of combatant status, and did not ratify AP I, in large part,
because of them."); Official Records, supranote 5, at 121 ¶ 17 (Israel explaining its vote
against the draft rule on grounds that it "was contrary to the spirit and to a fundamental

principle of humanitarian law").
25.
See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in
HumanitarianLaw: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT'L L.
(2010) ("IHL represents a carefully thought out balance between the
military necessity and humanity. Every one of its rules constitutes
compromise between these two opposing forces.").
26.

See JEAN

HUMANITARIAN

LAW

PICTET,

61-62

DEVELOPMENT

(1985)

AND

(discussing

PRINCIPLES

the

International
795, 798-801
principles of
a dialectical

OF INTERNATIONAL

fundamental

principles

of

international humanitarian law).

27.
See ICRC CIHL STUDY, supra note 1, at 166-67 ("Respect for and protection
of persons who are in the power of an adverse party is a cornerstone of international
humanitarian law[.").
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Article 48 of AP I and generally considered as reflecting customary
international law.28 The rule requires parties to the conflict to "at all
29
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants."
Since the definition of civilians is in the negative, that is, civilians are
those who are not combatants,3 0 the meaning of the term "combatant"
is the key to application of the rule, as well as its progeny, such as the
3
prohibition on attacking civilians or intentionally terrorizing them.
The classic definition of a combatant was first articulated with
binding force32 in Article 1 of the Regulations annexed to the 1899
Hague Convention II,33 which was subsequently incorporated verbatim
into the first article of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention
IV of 1907.34 The latter, which has long been deemed to reflect
customary international law,3 5 provided,
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

To
To
To
To

be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
carry arms openly; and
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory
28.
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶¶ 78-79 (July 8); Western Front, Aerial Bombardment
and Related Claims: Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, Partial Award,
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (Dec. 19, 2005) 26 R.I.A.A. 291, ¶¶ 93-95; ICRC
CIHL STUDY, supra note 1, at rr. 1, 7.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 48.
29.
Id. art. 50(1).
30.
Id. art. 51(2).
31.
See also PROJECT OF AN INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION CONCERNING THE
32.
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR (1874), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 23, 24

(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) (containing the first international
attempt to define combatant status). However, the Brussels Declaration was never
ratified and thus it did not acquire the force of a binding agreement. See KUBO MAAK,
INTERNATIONALIZED

ARMED

CONFLICTS

IN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

133-35

(2018)

(discussing the relevance of the Brussels Declaration for the historical development of
combatant status under IHL).
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex
33.
on Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900).
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to
34.
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct.
18, 1907, 205 C.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
See, e.g., Trial of the Major War Criminals, Judgment, International Military
35.
Tribunal, 253-54, Sept. 30, 1946; Judgment of 4 November 1948, International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, November 4, 1948 (IMTFE), reproduced in THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIAL vol. 22, at 48, 291 (R. John Pritchard & Sonia M. Zaide eds., 1981).
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In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part

of it, they are included under the denomination "army."3 6

The 1949 Geneva Conventions adopted these four conditions,
while making the criteria for combatant status even more stringent.
Article 4A of Geneva Convention III (GC III), which lists the categories
of persons who, if captured by the enemy, are to be accorded POW
status, is universally considered as setting forth the contemporary
criteria for combatant status under customary international law.3 7 It
provides, in relevant part:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons

belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of
the enemy:

(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or
an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.

Like its Hague Conventions counterparts, Article 4A of GC III
distinguishes between regular and irregular armed forces. The latter

36.

Hague Regulations, supra note 34, art. 1.

37.
See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1677, at 515 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987)
[hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY]
(acknowledging that

combatant status was not explicitly affirmed by Article 4A GC III, but considering it
implicitly included in the recognition of POW status); EMILY CRAWFORD, IDENTIFYING
THE ENEMY: CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN ARMED CONFLICT 17 (2015) ("Article 43 of

Protocol 1 and Article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention outline who is entitled to POW
status and, by extension, combatant status."); Sean Watts, Who Is a Prisonerof War?, in
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 890,

¶

2 (Andrew Clapham, Paola

Gaeta & Marco Sasshli eds., 2015) (noting that art. 4A GC III "has been perceived as a
merger of sorts between conditions for POW status and conditions expected of
combatants generally"); NOAM ZAMIR, CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE LEGAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS 136

(2017) (considering that the original purpose of art. 4A GC III was to determine who was
entitled to POW status and consequently to serve as a definition of a combatant).
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are subject to four conditions listed in the second subparagraph,
38
including that of having a "fixed distinctive sign," a requirement
39
satisfied by wear of a uniform, and of carrying their weapons openly.
It is these two requirements that Article 44(3) of AP I relaxes by means
of its "cannot so distinguish" text.
Experts in the field take differing views on whether the four
conditions implicitly apply to members of the armed forces, including
members of militia or volunteer corps forming part of the armed forces,
such that their failure to comply with them would deprive the
individuals concerned of the benefits of combatant status. Proponents
of their implicit application, including one of the authors, find support
in some case law, such as the Privy Council's 1968 judgement in
Mohamed Ali et al. v. PublicProsecutor, and the U.S. Supreme Court's
1942 Ex Parte Quirin decision. 40 Those taking the opposite view,
including the other author, point to the plain wording of the provision
and the fact that the conditions textually modify only that part of the
Article dealing with irregular forces, as confirmed by an examination
of the travaux of GC III.41
Nonetheless, this debate need not detain us, for AP I sets forth
separate conditions for parties to a conflict in which the instrument
applies. Article 43(2) stipulates that all members of armed forces other
than medical or religious personnel are combatants, thereby
dispensing with the clear distinction between regular and irregular

38.
Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4A(2)(b).
39.
Id. art. 4A(2)(c).
40.
See Ex parte Quirin et al., 317 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1942) ("Our Government, by
thus defining lawful belligerents entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, has
recognized that there is a class of unlawful belligerents not entitled to that privilege,
including those who though combatants do not wear 'fixed and distinctive emblems'.");
Mohamed Ali et al. v. Public Prosecutor (1968), [1969] AC 430, 449 (holding that
belonging to the armed forces does not suffice for an entitlement to receive prisoner of
war status); see also, e.g., DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 17, at 50-51;
Ian Brownlie, Decisions of British Courts During 1968 Involving Questions of Public or
PrivateInternationalLaw, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 217, 238-39 (1969); Gerald Draper, The
Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 173,
182 n.1 (1971) ("[Mlembership of armed forces is not enough to establish lawful
combatancy, unless members operate openly in combat in such capacity[.]"); W. Thomas
Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The JuridicalStatus of Irregular Combatants under the
InternationalHumanitarianLaw ofArmed Conflict, 9 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT'L L. 39,
74 (1977) (discussing the application of the POW conditions to regular combatants). But
see In re von Lewinski (called von Manstein), 16 I.L.R. 509, 515-16 (1949) (British
Military Court at Hamburg) (holding that "regular soldiers" did not have to meet the
four requirements in order to qualify as combatants).
41.

See, e.g., ALLAN RosAs, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 328 (1976)

("[B]oth in view of the wording and the legislative history of article 4 it cannot be a priori
concluded that the four requirements are constitutive conditions for prisoner-of-war
status with respect to regular forces[J"); MACAK, supra note 32, at 166-69; W. Hays
Parks, Special Forces'Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHICAGO J. INT'L L. 493, 50910 (2003); Watts, supra note 37, at 894.
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forces found in its predecessors. 4 2 Pursuant to Article 44(3) (quoted in
full above), combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian
population when conducting attacks or engaging in military operations
that are preparatory to an attack. In special situations (discussed at
greater length below), this requirement is somewhat relaxed, meaning
in particular that the beneficiaries of the exception do not have to wear
uniforms or other distinguishing garb or emblems. However, they must
still carry their weapons openly while engaged in attacks and during a
defined period before such attacks are launched. 43 Moreover, Article
44(7) stipulates that despite the exception, Article 44 "is not intended
to change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to the
wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular,
uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict." 44
Combatants who are captured during a conflict to which the
Protocol applies forfeit their POW status if they fail to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population to the extent required by
Article 44(3),45 although they are nevertheless entitled to "protections
equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war." 46
Moreover, even though they may be dressed as civilians, and despite
the fact that the reason they may have been so dressed is to enhance
their survivability in the battlespace, their conduct in failing to wear
distinctive clothing or emblems and hiding their weapons until
deployment to an attack does not amount to perfidy. 4 7

42.
See ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, T 1672, at 511-13
(explaining the modern dilution of the preexisting distinction between regular and
irregular forces); MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL J. PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TwO 1977 PROTOCOLS
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 236-38 (1982); HEATHER A.
WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION

MOVEMENTS 173-78 (1988) (outlining the nuances of distinguishing between regular and
irregular forces).
43.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3) ("Recognizing ... that there
are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of hostilities an armed
combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant,
provided that ... he carries his arms openly[.]").
44.
Id. art. 44(7).
45.
Id. art. 44(3) (noting that "he shall retain his status as a combatant" if the
requirements of the exception are satisfied) (emphasis added).
46.
Id. art. 44(4). For more on the treatment of such individuals despite their loss
of POW status, see ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37,

¶

1719, at 538;

BOTHE ET AL., supra note 42, at 289-90.
47.
See id. art. 44(3) ("Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph
shall not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1(c).");
see also id. art. 37(1)(c) (listing "the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status" as an
example of perfidy).
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III. TRAVAux PRPARATOIRES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

A product of extensive negotiations during the 1974-77
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, Article 44(3) is hardly an example
of concision and brevity. Revealingly, opinions regarding its text began
48
to differ soon after it had been tentatively approved. As a pars pro
toto example, while the delegate of Ivory Coast lauded the future
49
Article 44(3) as "crystal clear and requir[ing] no interpretation," the
Spanish representative saw it as "somewhat heterogeneous, sometimes
contradictory, and not altogether clear."5 0
The central question for the present purposes is the appropriate
interpretation of the second sentence of Article 44(3) in the context of
contemporary warfare. In this regard, the drafting history of the
Protocol is inconclusive. Not all of the delegations actively supported
the provision; ultimately, there were seventy-three votes for Article 44,
one against, and twenty-one abstentions.5 1 More to the point, the
United Kingdom perceptively opined that "any failure to distinguish
between combatants and civilians could only put the latter at risk.
That risk might well become unacceptable unless a satisfactory
interpretation could be given to [the provision]."52 The crucial
endeavor, therefore, lay in identifying situations qualifying as ones in
which combatants "cannot so distinguish" themselves.
Examination of the instrument's travaux reveals that delegations
that did not oppose adoption of the provision in Geneva broadly fell into
three categories vis-A-vis its scope of application. Firstly, many
Western states insisted that the future Article 44(3) would apply only
in occupied territories.5 3 Secondly, some states considered its
application to also extend to wars of national liberation as defined in
Article 1(4) of AP I.54 The remaining states typically praised the
adoption of the provision without limiting its application to any specific
situation.5 5
Upon ratification of the Protocol, many states that had aligned
themselves with one of the two more restrictive positions issued
interpretive declarations confirming their understanding of the

See generally Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 156-88 (providing
48.
countries' explanations for voting for or against the draft article).
49.
Id. at 171 1 12 (Ivory Coast).
50.
Id. at 162 T 41 (Spain).
51.
Id. at 121.
52.
Id. at 132 1 73 (United Kingdom).
53.
See, e.g., id. at 157 ¶ 12 (United Kingdom), 167 ¶ 63 (Germany), 170 ¶ 7
(Greece), 172 ¶ 19 (France), 176 ¶ 39 (Canada), 179 T 53 (United States), 186 ¶ 83 (New
Zealand).
See, e.g., id. at 159 ¶ 24 (Norway), 166 1 59 (Argentina), 174 ¶ 28 (Sweden).
54.
See, e.g., id. at 159-60 TT 26-27 (Egypt), 161 T 36 (Syria), 161 ¶ 39 (South
55.
Korea), 162 T 42 (India).
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applicative scope of the provision. 56 Although there was some
movement between the categories following the instrument's
adoption, 5 7 the three views continued to be represented among the
states parties. This implies that, at the very minimum, the provision
applies to situations of occupation because such cases form the lowest
common denominator on which all states parties to the Protocol seem
to be in agreement. 58 For instance, provided that the situationally
specific conditions stipulated in Article 44(3) had been met, it would
apply to Russian occupied territories during the international armed
conflict in 2008 between Georgia and Russia" as well as to the ongoing
occupation of Crimea by Russia in its international armed conflict with
Ukraine.6 0
However, belligerent occupation as the least common denominator
approach deriving from analysis of the travaux cannot be considered
conclusive with respect to the provision's interpretation. Chiefly, this

56.
For instance, Australia issued a declaration to the effect that "the situation
described in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can exist only in occupied territory or in
armed conflicts covered by paragraph 4 of Article 1." Treaties, States Parties and
Commentaries, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/

ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=10312B4E9047086EC 1
256402003FB253 (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W2S8-GUM7] (archived
Sept. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Australia Declaration]; see also Julie Gaudreau, The
Reservations to the ProtocolsAdditional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of

War Victims, 849 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 143, 152-53 (2003) (referring to ten such
declarations or reservations).
57.
For example, the United Kingdom modified its position to the extent that "the
situation in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can only exist in occupied territory or in
armed conflicts covered by paragraph4 of Article 1" (wars of national liberation). See
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-

databases.icre.org/ihl/NORM/OA9EO3FOF2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?Open
Document (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/82RN-G83L] (archived Sept. 12,
2018) (emphasis added).
58.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31(2)(a) (providing that for the
purposes of treaty interpretation, the relevant context also comprises "any agreement

relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty"). In this regard, see MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE
1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 430 ¶ 18 (2009) (noting that "the

term 'agreement' [in Article 31(2)(a) VCLT] is clearly wider and covers any contractual
instrument, in particular also agreements not in written form").
59.
See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING

MISSION

ON

THE

CONFLICT IN GEORGIA REPORT 311 (2009) (considering that the law of occupation was
applicable to certain parts of Georgia under Russian control); Military Occupation of
Georgia by Russia, GENEVA ACAD. (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/
military-occupation-of-georgia-by-russia#collapse2accord [https://perma.cc/5S5S-9KHJ]
(archived Nov. 3, 2018) (overview of the Georgian-Russia conflict).
60.
See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2016, at T 158, www.ice-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/

ON

161114-otp-rep-PE ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8L7-DTCZ] (archived Sept. 10, 2018)
(considering that "the situation within the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol factually
amounts to an on-going state of occupation").
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is because a limited consensus on the most restrictive interpretation of
a rule by the drafters should not be confused with agreement by
adherents of more permissive interpretations to abandon their views
in order to reach consensus. 61 All that can be said is that the most
restrictive interpretation appeared to be acceptable to all drafters.

IV. OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE EXCEPTION

With respect to the drafters' focus on occupation, it is essential to
point out that the travaux are preparatory works of a treaty. According
to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
which is generally considered reflective of customary law, preparatory
work is a "supplementary means of interpretation," one that acquires
valence only after the primary means of interpretation have failed to
62
provide a clear and reasonable meaning of the provision in question.
Accordingly, drafting history, while informative in itself, is of only
secondary value in the interpretation of treaties.
By contrast, Article 31 of the VCLT sets forth the determinative
interpretive mechanism: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
63
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Any
interpretation of Article 44(3) accordingly must consider its underlying
"object and purpose." 64 Although the usual order in which the methods
of interpretation provided for by the VCLT are employed begins with
the ordinary meaning of the terms, 65 there is no requirement to do so
and it is rather understood that they "are all of equal value; none are
of an inferior character." 6 6 In the present case, it is particularly helpful
to begin with the object and purpose of the provision in question.
Unusually, the telos of the provision is set forth expressly in its
opening sentence-"to promote the protection of the civilian population
from the effects of hostilities."6 7 At first glance, it might appear that

But see Frits Kalshoven, The Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and
61.
Development of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva,
1974-1977, in FRITs KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF WAR: COLLECTED ESSAYS

181, 202 (2007) (suggesting that at the conference "there was a marked unity of opinion
that the situations envisaged in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can arise solely in
occupied territory and in the case of wars of national liberation") (emphasis added).
Kalshoven's suggestion overstates the point given that many delegations did not
subscribe to either of the two more restrictive views. See supra sources cited in note 55.
Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 32.
62.
Id. art. 31(1).
63.
Id.
64.
65.

See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 187 (2007)

("One naturally begins with the text .... .").
VILLIGER, supra note 58, at 435.
66.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3).
67.
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this goal is incongruous with any relaxation of the obligation to
distinguish oneself. In that vein, it has been argued that allowing some
armed participants to dispense with the obligation, even for a limited
period of time, "seriously undermine[s] the principle which is so
important for the protection of the civilian population, namely the
presumption that apparently unarmed persons in civilian clothes pose
no threat and should not be attacked[.]" 6 8 This line of argumentation
suggests that the attenuation of the principle of distinction embodied
in Article 44(3) reduced or even "effectively nullif[ied]" the legal
protection for civilians.69 As Professor Geoffrey Corn has argued, the
provision supposedly diluted
one of the most important quid pro quos of humanitarian law: in exchange for
making yourself more easily distinguishable from the civilian population (and as
a result facilitating the ability of an enemy to lawfully attack you), the law
granted you the benefit of POW status with its accordant combatant immunity. 7 0

In our view, these assertions present an incomplete picture of the
provision and its legal effects. It must be borne in mind that the
threshold for the applicability of the exception in the second sentence
of Article 44(3) is particularly high. It requires that the only option the
potential beneficiaries have to continue fighting, is to dispense, to a
degree, with distinguishing themselves, in line with the ordinary
rules.71 Therefore, the actual choice in the situations in question is not
as simple as a legal-policy preference for combatants being easily
distinguishable from the civilian population or not. Instead, the crucial
question is how to treat, as a matter of law, the consequences of the
fact that the combatants in question are unable to distinguish
themselves if they wish to continue fighting. In other words, the choice
is between exceptionally permitting this mode of combat in limited
circumstances-and thus keeping those who engage in it within the
bounds of the law-and labelling them as persons operating in
violation of the requirements of IHL.
This being so, there is an even more fundamental quid pro quo
lying at the core of IHL than that highlighted by Professor Corn, that
is, the premise that by bestowing a degree of legal protection on the
combatants in question by recognizing the military necessity in limited
circumstances of relaxing the distinction requirement, the law

68.
M.H.F. Clarke, T. Glynn & A.P.V. Rogers, Combatant and Prisonerof War
Status, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: ASPECTS OF THE 1977 GENEVA
PROTOCOLS AND THE 1981 WEAPONS CONVENTION 120 (Michael A. Meyer ed., 1989).

69.
CRAWFORD, supra note 37, at 44.
70.
Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer
Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 253, 274 (2011).
71.
See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
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incentivizes them to abide by IHL generally. 7 2 The inclusiveness of the
law exerts a powerful pull dynamic that enables and strengthens
overall compliance. This was recognized by a number of delegations in
Geneva, as illustrated by a Norwegian delegate who noted that the
beneficiaries of the future Article 44(3) would thereby "be motivated to
73
ensure the application of international humanitarian law," which
"would in turn lead to a better protection of all war victims, and in
particularof the civilian population."74 As the ICRC Commentary to
the provision explains,
[gluerilla fighters will not simply disappear by putting them outside the law
applicable in armed conflict, on the basis that they are incapable of complying
with the traditional rules of such law. Neither would this encourage them to at
least comply with those rules which they are in a position to comply with, as this
75
would not benefit them in any way.

Seen from this perspective, it becomes clear why the availability
of combatant status for persons who take advantage of Article 44(3)'s
exception to the requirement of distinction can actually contribute to
the protection of the civilian population. By providing these fighters
with legal status and its attendant benefits, such as combatant
immunity and formal POW status, the law operates to encourage them
to respect and protect the civilian population. 76 This is because their
incentive to comply with the law will be reduced if their legal status
lies beyond the accepted boundaries of the law, thus making them
liable to prosecution for acts for which they would otherwise enjoy
combatant immunity, such as attacking the enemy and enemy military
objectives.
Faced with a choice between the Article 44(3) exception possibly
reducing civilian protection on the one hand and de-incentivizing
compliance with IHL in the absence of the exception on the other, a
teleological interpretation of the provision requires endorsing the
former, even if it may at first appear counterintuitive. But the question
remains, what interpretive standard best advances the telos of
optimizing protection of the civilian population?

72.

See, e.g., Howard S. Levie, Prisonersof War in InternationalArmed Conflict,

in 59 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1, 46 (1978). See generally Steve Nabors, A Right to
Fight: The Belligerent's Privilege, in RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE 23

(Charles Sampford, Spencer Zifcak & Derya Aydin Okur eds., 2015).
Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 158 ¶ 18.
73.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37,

¶

1684 at 521.

See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 1; Geneva Convention III, supra
76.
note 3, art. 1.
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V. ENEMY CONTROL OF BATTLESPACE

The evolution of warfare over the four decades since the adoption
of the Protocol, in particular the regular conduct of hostilities among
the civilian population, requires a reassessment of the terms of Article
44(3) in light of its object and purpose of "promot[ing] the protection of
the civilian population from the effects of hostilities." Armed with this
telos, it is possible to shape a contemporary approach to the exception.
Which potential understandings are legally viable falls to be
determined by reference to the aforementioned canons of
interpretation. As noted, the interpretive process starts with an
examination of the specific text of the relevant terms of the treaty in
accordance with its ordinary meaning.77 A possible initial obstacle in
this regard is the text at the beginning of Article 44(3)'s sentence in
question-"Recognizing . . . that there are situations in armed

conflicts."78 It could be objected that the word "recognizing" indicates
that the normative content of the following text is limited to situations
that pre-existed the adoption of the provision, and thus were within
the contemplation of the drafters.
However, it is difficult to reconcile such an objection with the
prevailing evolutive approach to the interpretation of AP I. The
approach was reflected in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)'s
modern construction of the so-called Martens Clause, which is
enshrined in Article 1 of the Protocol, 79 when the ICJ addressed "the
rapid evolution of military technology."80 Similarly, in the context of a
well-known debate over whether computer data qualifies as a military
objective under Article 52(2) of AP I, both sides notably accepted that
the provision is subject to dynamic interpretation, even though they
differed on the conclusion to which such interpretation led.81
The ICJ also employed the evolutive approach in its Navigational
Rights judgment. There, the court noted:

77.
Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31(1).
78.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3) (emphasis added).
79.
See id. art. 1(2) ("In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience."). The clause was
first set forth in the 1899 Hague Convention II, supranote 33, pmbl., and later replicated
in the 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 34, pmbl.
80.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 ¶ 78 (July 8).
81.
Compare Kubo Madbk, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting
Computer Data as Objects under InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 48 ISR. L. REV. 55,
70-71 (2015), with Michael N. Schmitt, The Notion of 'Objects'DuringCyber Operations:
A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision, 48 ISR. L. REV. 81, 94-95
(2015).

1370

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 51:1353

where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily
having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time,
and where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is "of
continuing duration", the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have
intended those terms to have an evolving meaning. 82

Self-evidently, AP I is a treaty of indeterminate duration and the
key terms in Article 44(3) ("situations," "nature of the hostilities," and
"military deployment") are of a generic nature. By the court's approach,
therefore, it is apposite to read the provision in a manner that permits
its adaptation to contemporary conflict. 83 It cannot be otherwise, for
law must remain responsive to the realities of combat in order to serve
its function of balancing military necessity and humanitarian
concerns.
Since the phrase "situations in armed conflicts" is adaptive to the
context in which it is to be applied, the challenge is to identify those
situations in modern warfare (in addition to situations of belligerent
occupation discussed above) that may qualify as ones in which, "owing
to the nature of the hostilities," combatants "cannot" distinguish
84
themselves from the civilian population. A well-known contemporary
critic of the Additional Protocol decried the modal verb "cannot" as "a
masterstroke of amoral draftsmanship."8 5 Beyond such unfortunate
hyperbole, though, how is the notion best understood in 2018 in the
context of protecting the civilian population from the effects of
hostilities?
To begin with, the exemption in the second sentence of Article
44(3) only applies in special situations, and not, for example, to
irregular armed forces in general. 86 After all, "cannot" implies that the
individuals in question have no other means of effectively continuing
to fight than dispensing with the requirement to wear a uniform,

Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
82.
Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 213, 243 1 66 (July 13).
Cf. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of
83.
Israel, 62(1) PD 507, ¶ 28 (2006) (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 373
("[Niew reality at times requires new interpretation. Rules developed against the
background of a reality which has changed must take on a dynamic interpretation which
adapts them, in the framework of accepted interpretational rules, to the new reality.").
It must be cautioned that the reference to "situations" in Article 44(3) denotes
84.
specific engagements as distinct from the entire conflict or campaign. Each engagement
must be judged on its own merits to determine whether the circumstances merit
application of the relaxed level of distinction provided for in the Article.
Douglas J. Feith, Law in the Service of Terror-The Strange Case of the
85.
Additional Protocol, 1 NAT'L INT. 36, 47 (1985).
See Kalshoven, supra note 61, at 201. On the distinction between regular and
86.
irregular forces, see supra Part II.
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distinctive sign, or other indicia that they are combatants. As the
United Kingdom's Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict observes,
"[t]he special rule is thus limited to those exceptional situations where
a combatant is truly unable to operate effectively whilst distinguishing
himself in accordance with the normal requirements."8 7
Accordingly, the fact that the weaker party could gain a military
advantageby being temporarily relieved of the duty of distinction does
not satisfy Article 44(3)'s "cannot" condition precedent. Similarly, it
does not suffice that relaxation of the duty would help balance any
operational inequities between the parties to the conflict. Both of these
interpretations would strip the relief in the second sentence of Article
44(3) of its exceptional character; the exception would swallow the rule
during the asymmetrical conflicts that have become so prevalent.
Indeed, taken to its logical extreme, if the issue was advantaging a
party to the conflict, the exception would apply in virtually all conflicts
because it would always afford the combatants to which it applied an
operational benefit of some sort. Relaxation of the distinction
requirement to such a degree would manifestly run counter to the
object and purpose of the provision.
Therefore, the test must be much stricter. In that regard, we agree
with the ICRC's commentary to Article 44(3), which emphasizes that
in order for the exception to apply, the balance of power must be "out
of all proportion in favour of one of the Parties."8 8 Such radical
imbalance means that the weaker party's combatants cannot
89
distinguish themselves while still retaining "a chance of success."

Qualifying situations are those in which the asymmetrically
disadvantaged belligerent has no remaining alternative but to resort
to conduct that would otherwise fail to comply with the duty of
distinction.o In other words, the exception demands that "the visible
carrying of arms and distinguishing signs . . . [must] really be

incompatible with the practicalities of the action (for example, if the
guerrilla fighters use the population for support or are intermingled
with it)."9 1 To comply with the requirement of distinction in the
situations envisaged would ensure mission failure.
This narrow construction explains why many delegations sought
to limit application of the provision either to wars of national liberation
or to occupied territories, for in such situations one party to the conflict
usually not only exercises far greater control over the area in question,

87.

¶

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 42

4.5.1 (2004) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter UK MANUAL].
88.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, T 1702 at 532 n.50.

89.

Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 453 T 19 (Report of Committee III).

90.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, T 1702 at 532.

91.
Id. at 530 n.40 (citing Charles Chaumont, La recherche d'un critbre pour
l'intigration de la gugrilla au droit international humanitaire contemporain, in
MELANGES OFFERTS A CHARLES ROuSSEAu 50 (1974)).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

1372

[VOL. 51:1353

but also typically enjoys superiority in terms of military capability. The
opposing side has little prospect of prevailing absent some relaxation
of the requirement to distinguish oneself from the civilian population.
However, these two situations fall short of optimizing the Article 44(3)
exception's goal of enhancing protection of the civilian population.
It may be the case that occupation reflects a high level of control
over territory such that enemy combatants cannot realistically
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. Indeed, occupying
powers often issue strict security measures that can dramatically
hinder the ability of enemy fighters to engage in military activities if
they are readily identifiable as such. For instance, during the
occupation of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority "de-ba'athified"
93
Iraqi society, 92 issued orders governing the possession of weapons
94
and
and public gatherings to which criminal penalties attached,
95
created a new Iraqi Army under its control. These and other actions
of the occupying forces severely limited the military practicality of
insurgent fighters, including the remnants of the former Iraqi Army,
complying with the requirement of distinction.
However, the legal test for occupation does not suffice as
normative shorthand for the requisite extent of control that is
necessary for application of the Article 44(3) exception. The applicable
customary law definition of occupation was set forth in treaty form in
Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations: "Territory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile
army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such
96
authority has been established and can be exercised."
This standard is the subject of some debate, thereby rendering it
unsuitable to play such an interpretive role. Certain experts are of the
view that occupation does not necessarily entail that the occupying
power is actually exercising its authority over the entirety of the
occupied territory. Rather, it suffices for that power to have the

92.

COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., ORDER No. 1: DE-BA'ATHIEFICATION

OF IRAQI

SOCIETY (2003), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edulNSAEBB/NSAEBB418/docs/9a%20-%20
Coalition%2oProvisional%2OAuthority%200rder%2No%201%20-%205-16-03.pdf
[https://perma.cclMJ3P-6CUG] (archived Nov. 3, 2018)
93.

COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., ORDER No. 3 (REVISED) (AMENDED): WEAPONS

CONTROL (2003), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20031231
CPAORD3REV AMD_.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV27-YLBB] (archived Sept. 1, 2018).
94.

COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., ORDER NO. 19: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2003),

http://govinfo.library.unt.edulcpa-iraq/regulations/20030710-CPAORD_19_Freedom
ofAssembly .pdf [https://perma.cclD5H6-D8S3] (archived Sept. 10, 2018).
95.

COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., ORDER No. 22: CREATION OF A NEW IRAQI ARMY,

(2003), http://govinfo.library.unt.edulcpa-iraq/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22
Creation of aNewjIraqiArmy.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARZ8-RHAX] (archived Sept. 1,
2018).
Hague Regulations, supra note 34, art. 42.
96.
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capacity to exert authority over the territory.97 An example would be a
situation in which forces are moving quickly through enemy territory
as the enemy is in full retreat. The former could leave troops in place
to establish sufficient control over areas from which they have
vanquished the enemy, thereby substituting their authority for that of
the enemy government. However, because doing so would slow the pace
of the advance, the decision is made to defer establishing that authority
in order to press the offensive with all available assets. This was the
case for a short period as Coalition forces raced north into Iraq in early
2013. By the aforementioned view as to when occupation commences,
it is conceivable that certain territory could be considered legally
occupied, and yet the level of control over the area wielded by the
offensive force would not be at a level triggering the Article 44(3)
exception.
Other scholars, relying on the ICJ's judgement in Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo, are of the view that the actual exercise of
authority in substitution of the enemy's is necessary before occupation
ensues as a matter of law.9 8 Consider a scenario in which the forces of
a party to the conflict are in military control of an area to such an
extent that the enemy cannot effectively operate in the open. However,
the military forces do not supplant the authority of the local regime,
for instance, by engaging in law enforcement, overseeing operation of
the judicial system, performing civil administrative duties, and the
like. In such a case, the area would not be considered occupied in the
legal sense by those taking this position, but the situation would
nevertheless meet the requirements for application of Article 44(3)'s
exception.
As noted, some of the Diplomatic Conference delegations included
wars of national liberation, defined in Article 1(4) of AP I, as situations
giving rise to the requisite control implied in Article 44(3).99 In our
view, such a standard would be overbroad, for in a war of national
liberation the force fighting the government may have the military
wherewithal necessary to engage in classic operations; indeed, it may
control significant territory itself. Further, there is nothing inherent in
a war of liberation, which is defined by reference to the motive for

97.

See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA

CONVENTION, ¶ 302, at 108 (2016) ("[T]here cannot be occupation of a territory without
effective control exercised over it by hostile foreign forces. However, effective control does
not require the exercise of full authority over the territory; instead, the mere capacity to
exercise such authority would suffice.").
98.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 116, T 173 (Dec. 19).
99.
See generally Official Records, supra note 5, Vol. XV at 159 T 24, 166 ¶ 59,
174 T 28 (setting forth the respective positions of Norway, Argentina, and Sweden); see
also supratext accompanying note 54.
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resorting to armed force against the government, that necessarily
implies the type of control that infuses the Article 44(3) exception.
As a practical matter, encompassing wars of national liberation
within the purview of the exception would in any event have little
practical effect. Article 1(4) has a very limited scope of application,
which has led to suggestions that it would "never be applied" and that
it amounted to "a dead letter." 0 0 Yet, the concept has recently seen
some limited revival. In 2015, Switzerland, as the depositary of AP I,
accepted an undertaking to apply the Geneva Conventions and the
Protocol that had been issued by the Polisario Front in the context of a
0
purported Article 1(4)-type conflict in Western Sahara.1 Although
this decision was challenged by the government of Morocco as the
supposed other party to the conflict,1 0 2 the events surrounding the
declaration have arguably breathed new life into Article 1(4).103
Nevertheless, situations qualifying as "wars of national liberation" in
the sense of Article 1(4) are extremely rare and likely to remain so.
In our view, the best interpretive understanding of the exception,
especially in the context of the prevalence of war among the civilian
population, is that it applies only in "enemy-controlled battlespace."
The phrase denotes a degree of control that precludes an opponent
force operating in that battlespace from distinguishing itself except as
provided for in Article 44(3), at least with any meaningful chance of
tactical success. Control must rise to the level of physical control by the
military or other security forces over a relatively well-defined area.
These situations are necessarily characterized by a high degree of
asymmetry between the parties to the conflict. For example, one party
may exercise control over an urban environment, while the other
attempts to disrupt and subvert that control. The fact that an armed
force or other fighters may still operate in the area does not necessarily
deprive the situation of the degree of control necessary to qualify as
being under enemy control. But they must not be able to do so openly

100. George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional
Protocol Ito the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1991).
101. See Switzerland, Fed. Dep't of Foreign Affairs, Notification to the Governments
of the States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of
War Victims (June 26, 2015), https://www.eda.admin.ch/damledalfr/documents/aussen
[https://perma.ccl39BH-QB2X]
politik/voelkerrecht/geneve/150626-GENEVE-en.pdf
(archived Sept. 10, 2018).
102. Letter from the Kingdom of Morocco (June 30, 2015), annexed to Switzerland,
Notification to the Governments of the States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims (July 9, 2015), https://www.eda.admin.ch/
damleda/fr/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/geneve/150709-GENEVE-avecanne.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL9M-2F8F] (archived Sept. 10, 2018).
103. See Kubo Ma6Ak, Wars of national liberation: The story of one unusual rule
II, OUP BLOG (July 30, 2018), https://blog.oup.com/2018/07/wars-national-liberationunusual-rule-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/9D4W-HV3A] (archived Sept. 1, 2018) (discussing
the impact of the unilateral declaration).
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and cannot meaningfully be able to contest control over the area in
question absent application of the Article 44(3) exception. Should no
party exert the requisite control over the battlespace, the exception
would not apply. 104
In our estimation, the notion of enemy-controlled battlespace
more closely approximates the object and purpose of Article 44(3) than
the unsettled legal standard of occupation or the rare conflict that
amounts to a war of national liberation. These two situations may be
characterized by the requisite level of control and thus qualify as
enemy-controlled, but satisfaction of their legal criteria is neither
necessary, nor necessarily adequate, for application of the Article 44(3)
exception. Therefore, the enemy-controlled battlespace standard better
withstands testing against the teleological underpinning of the
provision, for it limits the exception to application in only those
situations in which such an exception is truly necessary.

VI. LEGAL SAFEGUARDS
The goal of protecting the civilian population militates for great
care in applying the standard of enemy control of the battlespace to the
requirement of distinction's Article 44(3) exception. If abused, the
standard could endanger the civilian population by denying it the
protection typically attendant to distinction. Lest this concern be
exaggerated, it is important to highlight a number of safeguards that
have been built into the provision itself or can be implied from the
applicable law. They collectively serve to constrain potential
detrimental effects of applying the provision in modern warfare.
First and foremost, the beneficiaries of the exception are not
entirely relieved of the requirement of distinction. In order not to lose
combatant status, they still must carry their arms openly during the
military engagement and "[d]uring such time as [they are] visible to
the adversary while [they are] engaged in a military deployment
preceding the launching of an attack in which [they are] to
participate."1 0 5
While the concept of "military engagement" poses little
difficulty, 106 the notion of "military deployment" as used in this context

104. A complex situation is that in which there are more than two adversarial
parties operating in the same area. Application of the Article 44(3) exception would
depend on their mutual relationships. For discussion of such situations, see MACAK,
supra note 32, at 87-104.
105. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3).
106.

See ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37,

T

1708 at 534

(explaining that the concept "is self-evident" and "means that the arms must be carried
openly during the battle itself, whether it is of an offensive of defensive nature").
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is less clear.10 7 During the Diplomatic Conference, some delegations
considered that the latter term applies to the entirety of the tactical
movement from a hideaway to the point of attack.1 0 8 Others argued
that the concept of military deployment is limited to "the last step in
the immediate and direct preparation for an attack," in other words,
10 9
In our view, this latter
the moment of taking up one's firing position.
position is untenable, for it would negate entirely the goal of protecting
the civilian population. If the law permitted the complete concealment
of an attacker until the very moment of attack, the presumption that
animates this part of the law-that "apparently unarmed persons in
civilian dress do not attack"'" 0-would be eliminated. Thus, only the
former interpretation of the term military deployment is compatible
with the object and purpose of the exception.
However, the phrasing limits the requirement to carry one's arms
openly to such time as the combatants are visible to the adversary. In
the spirit of compromise that animates the text of this provision, this
aspect benefits the asymmetrically disadvantaged party. At the time
of drafting, it was suggested that it includes situations in which the
individuals concerned are potentially visible by technological means
such as binoculars and infrared equipment.n' Even viewed from the
perspective of 1970s technology, that position appears problematic, as
it makes the requirement dependent upon the adversary's level of
technological sophistication, with obvious negative implications for the
2
principle of equal application of the law.xx
From the perspective of contemporary warfare, such an
interpretation is even less defensible. With modern advances in
technology, the asymmetrically more powerful party that is in physical
control of the battlespace normally possesses technological methods
and means of warfare that render much of the battlespace highly
transparent. Drones with advanced sensor suites and extended loiter
capability, high resolution reconnaissance and surveillance satellites,
airborne communications intercept capabilities, and cyber espionage
come to mind. In the urban environment, CCTV cameras have the

107. See, e.g., BOTHE ET AL., supra note 42, at 288 ("The term 'deployment' has
many meanings in military usage.").
108. See, e.g., Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 167 1 64 (West Germany),
176 ¶ 38 (Canada); Australia Declaration, supra note 56 ("Australia will interpret the
word 'deployment' in paragraph 3(b) of the Article as meaning any movement towards a
place from which an attack is to be launched.").
109. Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 160 ¶ 29 (Egypt).
110. Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to Douglas J. Feith's Law In The Service of
Terror-The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 20 AKRON L. REV. 261, 268 (1987).
111. See Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 157 ¶ 13, 165 T 55 (setting forth
the respective views of the United Kingdom and Australia).
112. See Watkin, supra note 21, at 33 ('The idea that the visibility requirement
would be dependent upon the level of technological sophistication of the opponent
appears problematic in terms of requiring a reciprocal application of the law.").
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potential to passively surveil nearly every city street. To interpret the
condition of visibility as including all these means would render the
limitation meaningless because members of the asymmetrically
weaker force would have to assume they are constantly visible by the
adversary, and they therefore would have to carry their arms openly at
all times.
The more defensible interpretation is that the condition should be
understood as entailing a subjective standard; if combatants know or
should reasonably know that they are being actively observed by the
enemy, then the duty to carry their arms openly activates.1 1 3 This
certainly includes observation by the naked eye. It may also cover
active forms of observation using modern technology, albeit only to the
extent that the combatants may reasonably infer, with the information
available to them at the time, that they are presently visible to the
enemy, which is, at the same time, engaged in active observation. If
they do not know or should not reasonably conclude that is the case,
the obligation does not attach. Although this interpretation serves to
limit the period during which the obligation activates, its import is to
foster distinction during that time in which it will have its greatest
protective effect for the civilian population.
Secondly, the exception does not allow for a "revolving door"
phenomenon, whereby persons are only targetable while carrying their
arms openly in line with the requirements of the provision, but
considered civilians immune from attack at all other times. 114 In fact,
the opposite is true. The requirements of Article 44(3) do not bear upon
whether one is a combatant or not; they merely determine whether or
not that person has committed a breach of IHL by failing to distinguish
themselves. 115 The beneficiaries of the rule thus remain targetable
irrespective of the exceptional applicability of Article 44(3) at any
particular time.
Admittedly, if a group of such persons are collocated with the
civilian population, as would be the case in an urban environment,
their presence represents a substantial risk of collateral civilian
casualties." 6 Still, it must be remembered that in targeting these
individuals, the adversary must abide by the other applicable rules,

113. Cf. Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 161 ¶ 37 (Syria) ("[T]he rule set
forth in paragraph 3 implied that the combatant knew or ought to know that he was
visible to the enemy, otherwise the obligation to carry arms openly did not apply.").
114. Cf., e.g., Geoffrey Best, The Restraint of War in Historical and Philosophical
Perspective, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF FRITS KALSHOVEN 3, 25 (Astrid J. M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds.,
1991) (arguing that the effect of Article 44(3) was that guerrillas off combatant duty
would qualify as civilians).
115. IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING 83 (2009).
116. Solf, supra note 110, at 275.
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117
the rule of
including the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks,
118
the duty to exercise constant care to spare the
proportionality,
civilian population,1 1 9 and the requirement to take all feasible
precautions in attack to minimize incidental civilian injury or death
1 20
and damage to civilian property.
Thirdly, the same is true with respect to the beneficiaries of the
Article 44(3) exception. The provision does not relieve them of their
duty to comply with all other applicable obligations under IHL. In
particular, when conducting military operations, they still have to
respect the principle of distinction, and thus only direct their
operations against military objectives.121 Additionally, they are

equally subject to the general obligation to take "constant care .

.

. to

spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects" in their
military operations,1 22 as well as to the specific obligation to endeavor,
to the maximum extent feasible, "to remove the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the
23
vicinity of military objectives."1
Consequently, such individuals remain obliged to avoid any
unnecessary harm to civilians even while operating pursuant to the
exception. This includes harm that could foreseeably be caused by their
enemy in response to the nature of the operation undertaken by the
combatants acting under the exception to the requirement of
distinction. If, for instance, it is reasonably foreseeable that the
enemy's reaction to an ambush in a densely populated area like an
open-air market would risk extensive loss of civilian life, the
precautionary rules might require refraining from the attack and
1 24
waiting for another opportunity to act.
Fourthly, the effect of the provision is limited to a single kind of
deception in armed conflict, namely the pretense of being an unarmed
civilian in highly asymmetrical situations. For this reason, the closing
sentence of Article 44(3) clarifies that conduct in accordance with the
requirements prescribed by that provision shall not be considered as

117. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(4).
118. Id. arts 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).
119. Id. art. 57(1).
120. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
121. Id. art. 48.
122. Id. art. 57(1).
123. Id. art. 58(a). For the practical difficulties this requirement poses in the urban
environment, see Nathalie Durhin, Protecting Civilians in Urban Areas: A Military
Perspective on the Application of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 98 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS, 177, 195-97 (2016).
124. See also WHEN WAR MOVES TO CITIES, supra note 14, at 6 ("Conducting an
analysis of civilian patterns of life in an area of planned operations may inform tactical
choices to avoid and minimize harm. Indeed, timing an operation so as to minimize
civilian harm is a tangible step that parties to conflict can take to fulfill their obligation
to take all feasible precautions.").
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perfidious within the meaning of Article 37(1)(c) of AP I.125 However,
all other acts designed to mislead the adversary by feigning protection
under IHL, and then betraying any resulting confidence, would still be
perfidious and, if they result in the killing, injuring, or capturing of the
adversary, would qualify as a violation of the prohibition of perfidy.1 26
Consider, for example, a situation of armed violence in the urban
environment with the presence of UN relief agencies. Even if the
conditions for the applicability of Article 44(3) AP I are met, the
asymmetrically disadvantaged party would still be prohibited from
using the distinctive UN emblems in attacking its opponents. 12 7 Such
conduct would qualify as perfidy12 8 and might amount to a grave
breach of the Protocol.129
Finally, even if combatants meet the requirements of Article 44(3),
this only means they retain their combatant status. They nevertheless
remain liable for prosecution for war crimes. As reflected in Article 85
of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, the question of prosecution
for such conduct is separate from the determination of combatant or
prisoner of war status.1so

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The contemporary propensity for, and risk of, armed conflict
taking place among the civilian population has cast a new light on a
number of the long-standing challenges to the application of IHL
during modern warfare. One is the determination of combatant status.
This Article explored the possibility of reviving AP I's oft-reviled
Article 44(3) by adopting an interpretation thereof that better comports
with the object and purpose of the provision than those previously in
vogue.
Our view is that it is inapposite to conflate the applicability of this
provision with other self-standing legal tests found in IHL. In

125. Additional Protocol I, supranote 1, art. 44(3), third sentence.
126. Id. art. 37(1); see also Watkin, supra note 21, at 63 ("However, any allegation
of perfidy has to be considered carefully. Perfidious conduct requires intent to betray
confidence. The simple wearing of civilian clothes even to cloak entry into another
country or zone of operations is not perfidious.").

127.
128.

See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 37(1)(d).
Id.

129.

Id. art. 85(3)(f); see also ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note

37, T 3499 at 999 n.27 (noting that if "the United Nations [is] engaged in hostilities ...
its emblem is therefore no longer a protective emblem within the meaning of Article 37
and of this sub-paragraph").
130. See Geneva Convention III, supranote 3, art. 85 ("Prisoners of war prosecuted
under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain,
even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.").
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particular, and although it is possible that the exceptional
circumstances to which the Article 44(3) exception applies arise in such
situations (as some states participating in the Diplomatic Conference
concluded), the legal tests for the existence of occupation or of a war of
national liberation do not suffice for determining the applicability of
Article 44(3). It is possible, for instance, to have a situation during
occupation or a war of national liberation to which the provision does
not apply, while it is equally conceivable that the provision would apply
in scenarios other than these two.
Accordingly, we suggest that the appropriate test is one of actual
control over battlespace. If the enemy maintains a degree of control
over the physical battlespace that renders a combatant "truly unable
to operate effectively whilst distinguishing himself in accordance with
1 31
This will
the normal requirements," then the provision applies.
often, although by no means always, be the case during hostilities
occurring in the proximity of the civilian population, such as urban
combat, and that are characterized by asymmetrical distribution of
power, resources, and physical control between the parties.
In such limited circumstances, the provision-widely considered
either obsolete or subsiding into irrelevance-may obtain a fresh lease
of life. However, it bears recalling that as a non-customary provision of
AP I, it would only apply to international armed conflicts involving
states parties to the instrument. Still, with over 170 states having
ratified the Protocol so far, and with combat occurring among the
civilian population with appalling frequency, its relevance will only
increase in the near future. And since nonparties to AP I, notably the
United States, now regularly fight in coalitions with states that are
party thereto, commanders and other representatives of the former
must take into account the manner in which their coalition partners
are likely to operate.
Finally, we caution that the applicability of the exception in
Article 44(3) does not amount to a "get out of jail free" card for its
beneficiaries. Far from it, the compromise between military necessity
and humanitarian considerations that lies at the heart of the provision
entails a number of important safeguards intended to promote the
protection of the civilian population in situations to which the
exception applies. In this regard, it is incumbent on all parties to the
conflict-the asymmetrically weaker as well as the asymmetrically
more powerful-to understand that, in the words of Jean de Preaux,
32
"by protecting the civilian population they protect themselves."'

131. UK MANUAL, supra note 87, at 42 1 4.5.1 (emphasis in original).
132. Jean de Preaux, The ProtocolsAdditional to the Geneva Conventions, 27 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 250, 250 (1987).

